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ABSTRACT 
The first part presented a philosophical staircase that can guide IS 
practitioners in identifying the various validity claims raised by any project of 
information systems definition, design, and development (ISD). It was concluded 
that the discursive principle is constitutive of every step in this staircase but 
requires pragmatization. The present second part of the paper begins with a 
short review of the way in which the discursive principle has been considered in 
the ISD literature thus far. It then introduces the second main pillar of the 
suggested approach to reflective practice in ISD, critically systemic discourse. 
The methodological core concept of critically systemic discourse is boundary 
critique, a concept based in the author’s work on critical systems heuristics and 
critical systems thinking. Based on this core concept and a practical application, 
a three-stage model for reflective practice in ISD is suggested. 
6 THE DISCURSIVE PRINCIPLE IN 
THE ISD LITERATURE 
Despite the constitutive character of the 
discursive principle for the validity claims 
involved in ISD, relatively few authors have 
systematically considered its implications for 
the design and use of information systems. On 
the other hand, I find it interesting and 
encouraging indeed that those attempts of 
which I am aware have come to conclusions 
that I can easily relate to a discursive 
understanding of our philosophical staircase as 
I have suggested it in the last Section of Part 2. 
I would like to refer the reader particularly to 
three contributions by Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim (1986), Nissen (1989), and 
Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen (1996). A 
brief review of these contributions in the light 
of the present paper appears useful to further 
illustrate its implications and hopefully to 
concretize some of the challenges on the way 
ahead. 
Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1986): “IS 
as rational discourse.” These two authors 
were among the first to analyze the use of 
information systems in the light of Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action. This effort 
made them recognize that the prevailing 
description of information systems in technical 
terms tends to prevent us from fully 
appreciating their social nature. They refer to 
communicative practices in organizations 
which “impose constraints on people’s 
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behavior but which can also be transformed by 
knowledgeable social actors” (1986, p. 20). 
The formal and institutionalized nature of IS 
creates obstacles to such transformations (an 
observation that fits in nicely with the example 
of hospital information systems considered at 
the end of Part 1) Lyytinen and Hirschheim are 
equally concerned about the fact that 
“information systems cannot be dissociated 
from social power as a capacity for getting 
things done.” (1986, p. 23) As a consequence 
of these circumstances they diagnose serious 
“barriers to the use of IS as a discourse” (1988, 
p. 23f): 
The formal nature of communication via an 
information system … does not fulfill one 
of the ground rules for a discourse: the 
chance to express opinions through 
argumentation. The institutionalization 
denies another rule (full symmetry in 
participation). Finally, the use of IS in 
organizations does not usually test 
participants’ opinions as discourse does 
(except perhaps teleconferencing). Instead, 
information systems compel their users to 
act, thus producing particular social 
relations across time and space. (Lyytinen 
and Hirschheim 1988, p. 24) 
In these barriers they suspect the reason 
why hardly any IS definition thus far has been 
based on a discursive concept of action. I 
understand their paper as an effort to 
demonstrate how the use of information 
systems can overcome these barriers. 
Basically, the authors see two possibilities 
(1986, p. 24f, italics are mine): IS can serve as 
“a means of discourse,” that is, provide by 
themselves discursive opportunities; or IS can 
be of “use in discourse,” that is, serve as a 
means for supporting discourses that are going 
on in their environment independently of their 
existence.  
Information systems may provide 
discursive opportunities in three ways (1988, 
p. 24f): 
1. They can establish new channels of 
communication among people across 
conventional hierarchic and spatial 
barriers.  
2. They can render social relationships 
among those involved more symmetrical, 
thereby redistributing the social or 
organizational positions and skills that 
provide access to information and also 
allow those who have access to question 
the rationality of prevailing 
interpretations.  
3. They can produce new information that 
calls for a critical review of dominant 
practices and policies and for validating 
the underlying organizational or social 
norms and values; at the same time, such 
new information can support local 
discourses within the organizational or 
social environment concerned in 
criticizing and transforming the practices 
in question. 
Information systems may support 
ongoing discourses in two ways (1988, pp. 25-
27): 
1. The may provide information that can be 
used as data (in Toulmin’s sense of 
evidence) or warrant to support 
argumentation. (The reader may wish to 
add backings, too.) 
2. As an indirect consequence of learning to 
use information systems according to 
Toulmin’s structure of argumentation, 
users may also begin to understand 
information in terms of speech act theory 
(as communicative or discursive action) 
rather than in the usual information-
theoretic terms (as a reduction of 
uncertainty) and consequently improve 
their communicative practices. 
In conclusion, Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim (1988, p. 28) postulate that ISD 
should give more attention to three 
implications of seeing information systems as 
related to discourse: 
(i) Information systems should facilitate 
discursive action by the users.  
(ii) ISD methodologies should provide 
“institutional arrangements that 
approximate the ground rules of rational 
discourse.” (It remains unclear whether 
they mean to request this for ISD 
methodologies only or also for the 
resulting IS.) 
(iii) The implementation of information 
systems and their acceptance by the users 
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should be seen as an issue of creating 
legitimacy with respect to the four validity 
claims involved, comprehensibility, 
truthfulness, truth, and rightness. 
Nissen (1989): ISD for responsible 
actors. Nissen’s basic concern is that IS users 
should “understand how others try to influence 
them through this medium,” and his central 
question therefore is: “How can information 
systems be developed supporting responsible 
action?” (1989, p. 99) Actors act responsibly, 
according to Nissen, if they consider the way 
an action may affect other people and also 
question its underpinning notion of human 
progress. Nissen speaks of actors rather than 
“users” to emphasize the irreducible autonomy 
and responsibility of IS users with respect to 
their use of “information.” For instance, acting 
rather than merely using an IS implies some 
responsibility of informing oneself and 
learning not only through the institutionalized 
IS itself but also through self-selected sources, 
in particular through direct interaction with 
people who can offer alternative and 
independent information. This is so important 
because IS ought to be looked at as 
representing “a special case of institutionalized 
argumentation” (1989, p. 101): they have been 
modeled so as to influence users in their ways 
of handling a certain context of decision-
making and argumentation, typically a context 
related to work in an organization. 
Computerized information systems try to 
achieve this by means of embedded data-
processing systems; Nissen calls them “data 
systems” as distinguished from “information 
systems.” Data systems “represent an extreme 
form of institutionalization” (1989, p. 107), for 
they need to model both the argumentation 
structure and the context of interest in a way 
that is “closed.” (1989, p. 111) That is to say, 
the system is insensitive to a broader social 
and historical context of action and to the ways 
in which this context may evolve over time; it 
can acquire no additional knowledge of the 
context and of the sources of evidence, 
warrants, and backings or of possible rebuttals 
but must take all this for granted. Furthermore, 
the rigid deductive-logical and numerical 
argumentation structure built into data systems 
does not exhaust all forms of relevant and 
sensible human argumentation, as it has no 
way of assessing arguments or actions in terms 
of values (1989, p. 104). The “argumentation 
metaphor” thus points to a fundamental 
difference between data systems and 
information systems, one that no development 
of data-processing methods and technology 
will ever eliminate (1989, p. 106f). 
Accordingly, Nissen concludes, 
No attempts should be made to substitute 
an information system 100 per cent by data 
systems. This would deprive actors and 
people affected of checking the claims 
produced and thereby of their rights to act 
responsibly. Further large parts of the data 
systems would have to be designed to meet 
very infrequent events. (1989, p. 107) 
In order to demystify the way 
information systems work, Nissen translates 
his argumentation metaphor into a simple 
graphic “argumentation model” for IS use and 
development. The graphic shows data systems 
as an embedded part of an information system 
and this as an embedded part of “work in a 
field of action,” which I understand as an 
organizational context of work and interaction. 
All three systems depend for their functioning 
on the action and interaction of people 
(informers and actors). Interaction of 
responsible actors always implies the use of 
information and argumentation in a way that is 
independent of the institutionalized systems; 
the structure of argumentation is understood 
according to Toulmin’s (1962) model. The 
three systems differ in the way the 
underpinning argumentative structure is built 
into them; while in data systems it is rigid and 
closed, in information systems – properly seen 
in their organizational context of work and 
interaction – it is open in the sense that  
Actors, their informers, and people affected 
will always have to argue with each other 
outside all data systems available for this 
purpose. New methods and technology only 
move the boundary between data systems 
and other parts of an information system, 
never eliminate them. (1989, p. 107).  
Likewise, all conceivable developments 
of information systems can only expand the 
boundary between the institutionalized system 
and the field of action of which it is a part; 
they should never make us forget this 
boundary. Nor should they make IS designers 
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assume the main problem is to redesign 
embedded data systems so as to extend their 
range of application: “Learning and re-
socialization dominates the evolution of these 
other parts, not redesign of data system.” 
(1989, p. 107).  
Responsible actors will therefore never 
exclusively rely on this institutionalized form 
of argumentation; to the extent they do rely on 
it, they will demand the best evidence, warrant 
and backing for an “information” before 
accepting it as a valid claim for action. That 
means for IS designers and developers that a 
good information system should help actors to 
assess and question this implicit claim for 
action in every concrete application, for 
instance by suggesting context-related 
questions, by qualifying the validity of 
information with respect to their suggested 
argumentative force (qualifying expressions 
for data and warrants), or by offering 
conceivable rebuttals in the form of counter-
evidence or alternative warrants and backings 
that might capture aspects of the specific 
context (1989, p. 107 and p.110). 
Much better than working toward the 
mistaken ideal of substituting an information 
system by automated data systems – an ideal 
that means to “deprive actors and people 
affected of [the possibility of] checking the 
claims produced and thereby of their rights to 
act responsibly” – ISD should seek to “exploit 
the interactiveness of today’s computers”; this 
promises to be “not only more ethical but also 
more profitable” (1989, p. 107). Since 
responsible action involves resolving conflicts, 
ISD should learn to conceive of IS as 
“judgment based information systems, i.e., 
information systems in which there are actors 
striving to act responsibly.” (1989, p. 110). 
Finally, the model implies that the process of 
IS development itself “could be looked upon 
as a discourse about how the current way of 
institutionalized argumentation may be 
redesigned” (1989, p. 105). 
Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen 
(1996): ISD as “rational argumentation 
design” and “institutional democracy 
design.” This paper offers a comprehensive 
review of the diversity of IS development 
strategies that one can find in different schools 
of IS research as seen through an action-
theoretic framework which, the authors claim, 
explains the “intellectual structures of ISD” 
and offers a pluralist conception of IS as an 
academic discipline (1996, p. 4). Based on 
Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative 
action as well as Etzioni’s (1968) social 
theory, the authors devise a classification 
scheme for interpreting and relating the many 
different research orientations in the field. 
They follow (more or less) Habermas in 
distinguishing between four orientations in 
ISD change through which systems developers 
can approach ISD: an instrumental, strategic, 
communicative or discursive orientation. The 
first two orientations look at IS primarily as a 
means of “control”; the third orientation looks 
at IS as a means for creating shared meanings 
through “sense-making,” and the fourth as a 
means for clarifying or justifying claims 
through “argumentation.” (1996, pp. 10-12) 
The authors then follow Etzioni in 
distinguishing between three principal domains 
of ISD change on which IS researchers may 
focus: “technology,” “language,” or 
“organization.” The first domain focuses on 
hard- and software development and considers 
the fact that new technology is often the 
driving force in IS change. The second domain 
focuses on the fact that IS influence, and are 
influenced by, patterns of “socially organized 
human behavior” such as work arrangements 
and procedures, roles and positions of actors. 
The third domain, finally, focuses on the fact 
that IS define forms and contents of 
communication in organizations and hence, 
chances for reaching common understanding 
about conditions and goals of action. (1996, 
pp. 12-16) 
The two dimensions combine to a grid 
of twelve classes or “change frames” for ISD. 
Three of these are vacant since a focus on 
technology as the primary domain of change 
combines with an instrumental action 
orientation only; the other two domains of 
change combine with each of the four action 
orientations. The framework thus serves to 
identify nine development strategies (1996, p. 
17f). I will limit my account to the discursive 
orientation. Combined with a focus on 
language (speech acts) as the primary domain 
of change, it yields an IS development strategy 
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called “systems for rational argumentation” or 
rational argumentation design; combined with 
a focus on organization as domain of change, it 
yields a strategy called “systems for 
institutionalized checks and balances” or 
institutional democracy design (1996, p. 17). 
• 
Designing systems for rational 
argumentation is a strategy that once again 
draws on Toulmin’s pragmatic logic of 
argumentation and tries to design information 
systems so that they do justice to it and 
consequently can support rational 






The basic idea is warrant design (1996, p. 
41), a concern that has received increasing 
attention since Churchman’s (1971) 
seminal discussion of the problem of how 
an information system can guarantee the 
validity of its results. Ideally the system 
design would include all the warrants 
(inference rules and backings) needed for 
deriving the results from some evidence 
(data). However, at latest since 
Churchman has analyzed the problem in 
the light of alternative theories of 
knowledge, we know there is no 
epistemological basis for complete 
warrant design – no conceivable design 
for an information system can serve as its 
own guarantor (Ulrich 1985, p. 874).  
To the extent that warrant design must 
remain incomplete, the next best option is 
building in some cross checking ability 
(1996, p. 21). Once again the basic idea is 
that the system should allow users to 
understand and assess the information it 
provides by disclosing both the evidence 
and the warrants it uses. This puts users in 
a situation where they can either feed in 
independent evidence or modify the logic 
by changing warrants. The main approach 
is thus (in my own terms) to promote 
independent argumentation by system 
users through a meta-level discursive 
process, or in the terms of the authors, “to 
design systems that generate information 
to directly support the structure of 
arguments and counter arguments.” (1996, 
p. 41) A complementary ideal is seen by 
the authors in Goldkuhl’s (1991) 
requirement of transparency for design 
decisions in the ISD process.  
A third basic idea proposed by the authors 
is a critical audit approach of IS designers 
with respect to all validity claims implied 
by a specific system design, particularly 
concerning the trustworthiness of the 
system’s internal design and operations 
(1996, p. 39f).  
Finally, the authors recognize that this 
development strategy of rational 
argumentation design implies renouncing 
the idea that knowledge can be adequately 
represented by formal structures of 
predicate logic or some other “mono-
logical” structure (1996, p. 42). 
Designing systems for institutionalized 
checks and balances, the second strategy for 
pursuing a discursive orientation, goes beyond 
rational argumentation design in that it 
considers the distorting effects of hierarchy 
and other sources of asymmetries of influence 
and power in organizations. It is therefore 
oriented to eliminating or neutralizing such 
effects through institutionalized checks and 
balances. It sees information systems as 
vehicles for improving organizational or social 
conditions for rational argumentation:  
The basic idea is to design information 
systems so that they help to foster and 
sustain a competitive market of ideas. Two 
possible metaphors for conceiving of this 
idea are IS as “public media” that provide 
for openness and diversity of information, 
along with principles of free speech and 
equal access; or IS as a “court of justice” 
which allows different actors to argue 
their case with opposing evidence. (1996, 
p. 21) 
ISD might aim “to introduce channels for 
cross-checking data and claims, introduce 
checks and balances against subconscious 
bias and self-deception, and to reduce 
defensiveness and other psychological 
barriers to free inquiry, e.g. double-loop 
learning” (1996, p. 42, with reference to 
Argyris and Schön 1978). Such measures 
are intended to help approximate, however 
imperfectly, the presuppositions of an 
ideal speech situation.  




                                                
Ideas such as “due process,” equal 
availability of information, equal 
obligation and opportunity to defend one’s 
argument, peer review, independent 
outside reviews, transparency of 
normative issues, widest possible debate 
of issues including stakeholder 
involvement and (where indicated) citizen 
participation, as well as a strong role of 
the public media, are among the ideas 
further mentioned by the authors in this 
context; the common concern is to enable 
and support critical thinking. (1996, p. 25 
and 42f).  
Finally, the authors also refer to my own 
critical systems heuristics and its 
“evaluation of boundary judgments (i.e. 
how to identify and design for the ‘limits’ 
of the design)” as a strategy for 
institutional democracy design (1996, p. 
43). This conforms to the basic 
emancipatory concern of my approach in 
promoting more “symmetry of critical 
competence” among social actors (see, 
e.g., Ulrich 1993, p. 604f, and 2000a, p. 
259); however, classifying critical 
heuristics as an approach to institutional 
democracy design risks creating a 
misunderstanding concerning its aims. I 
would like to point out that critical 
heuristics aims to promote chances for 
mutual understanding and compelling 
argumentation in general, on the part of 
citizens as much as professionals, by 
opening up potentials of cogent critique 
with respect to both the theoretical and the 
practical dimension of reason, in a way 
that does not depend on any specific 
expertise nor specific institutional 
requirements. Insofar I would say that 
critical heuristics is as much a conceptual 
tool for “rational argumentation design” as 
for “institutional democracy design.” The 
remainder of the present paper will be 
dedicated to an outline and illustration of 
this approach. I would like to explore its 
potential of supporting critical reflection 
and discourse about the design and use of 
information systems along the lines of our 
philosophical staircase. 
Conclusion. In my judgment, we can 
hardly overestimate the importance of the 
discursive principle for the future of ISD. The 
idea that information systems represent a kind 
of “frozen” argumentative structure that users 
as well as other concerned parties need to 
“unfreeze” to make proper use of them, is 
compelling and can inspire new directions of 
IS research. Yet, the fact is that progress along 
these lines has been slow and (as far as I can 
see) has remained a rather marginal concern of 
IS professionals. One major reason that I see is 
that the correspondence theory of truth, 
according to which proper information and 
valid knowledge is “what corresponds to the 
facts,” is still so firmly entrenched among 
professionals as well as lay people. A second, 
related reason may be that the idea of 
discursive rationality – discursive examination 
of validity claims – is still relatively new and 
will take time to overcome the prevailing 
confusion of applied science with practical 
rationality. However, I suspect that the most 
serious difficulty is the “utopian” character of 
the discursive principle. Discourse, as we have 
seen, can establish claims to relevant 
information, valid knowledge, and rational 
action only under ideal conditions, and even 
then only if it can continue until consensus is 
reached by no other means than 
argumentation. The discursive principle of 
validation is an ideal, no less than any other 
approach to rational practice.  
The conclusion is inevitable: if the 
discursive principle is to gain a major role, it 
can only be if we succeed in pragmatizing it in 
a critically tenable way. This is the aim of the 
critical turn1 that I advocate. Applied to the 
discursive principle, it means that we might do 
well to understand discourse as a means of 
critique only, rather than understanding it as a 
device that aims at validation. This does not 
throw the ideal of sufficient justification over 
board but rather understands it as a critical 
principle only, a principle that requires a 
systematic effort of uncovering the inevitable 
justification deficits of all ISD practice. Let us 
then turn to this issue of a critical turn of our 
understanding of discursive practice and see in 
what way it may help us in promoting 
reflective practice in ISD. 
 
1  Compare note 1 and 4 in Part 1 (pp. 55 and 74). 
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7 CRITICALLY SYSTEMIC 
DISCOURSE: TOWARD 
REFLECTIVE PRACTICE IN ISD 
Barriers to rational discourse. The 
basic idea of our approach to promoting 
reflective practice in the design and use of IS 
should be clear: designing, using and 
developing information systems entails a 
multitude of assumptions2 and corresponding 
validity claims. The philosophical staircase 
represents an attempt to arrange these 
assumptions and claims according to nine 
fundamental issues.  It offers a systematic 
order for examining these issues, in the sense 
that each subsequent step presupposes all 
previous steps. Sometimes a step will raise 
questions that prompt us to go back to previous 
steps and review pertinent assumptions, but 
basically the staircase guides us in proceeding 
from the lowest to the highest step. The 
methodological device for taking each step is 
discourse. Each step requires a discursive 
effort of uncovering and examining the 
assumptions and claims involved. In order to 
deal systematically with the presuppositions 
and implications of specific information 
system designs, we can thus climb the stairs 
step by step, reflecting on the assumptions we 
want to rely on and the validity claims they 
imply, and then submitting the answers to 
discursive validation by all parties concerned.  
                                                 
2  By assumptions, I mean any kind of 
presuppositions that underlie a concrete systems 
definition or design, whether deliberately so or not. 
In particular, they include not only empirical 
assumptions regarding relevant circumstances 
(“facts”, “evidence” to be considered or left out) but 
also normative assumptions regarding appropriate 
value judgements (norms; on the meaning of 
“normative” and “norms,” compare note 2 in Part 1, 
p.62). Assumptions can be either implicit (tacit) or 
explicit (overtly declared). Explicit assumptions are 
more conducive to reflective practice than implicit 
ones, as they can be reflected and challenged by all 
parties concerned. Implicit assumptions can be 
made in three ways: (a) unintentionally, as they are 
not seen by those making them; (b) consciously but 
in an unreflecting way, as they are taken for 
granted; or (c) consciously and deliberately, as the 
ones making them are not interested in disclosing 
them. Critical reflection and discourse aim first, at 
uncovering (making explicit) implicit assumptions; 
second, at unfolding the selectivity of all explicit 
assumptions with regard to the facts and values they 
exclude from consideration; third, at clarifying the 
implications and practical consequences they may 
have for the different parties concerned; and fourth, 
at examining or challenging the validity claims 
linked to these assumptions in the light of the 
previous three requirements. 
However, a crucial methodological 
problem remains. We have noted earlier (in 
Section 3) three fundamental barriers to 
achieving complete rationality in discourses 
about validity claims: First, consensus is a 
scarce resource. Second, where consensus on 
assumptions is effectively reached, it validates 
these assumptions only to the extent that we 
can assume that an ideal speech situation has 
been approximated. Third, even where this is 
feasible to a credible extent, there remains the 
fundamental problem of boundary judgments. 
Let me now turn to this much-neglected yet 
crucial problem. 
The problem of boundary judgments. 
No argument can be completely rational in the 
sense of justifying all the assumptions on 
which it depends as well as all the 
consequences it may have. What ought to 
count as knowledge, that is, as relevant 
circumstances, “facts” and “evidence” that 
should be considered? And what counts as 
relevant concerns, that is, value judgments 
concerning purposes, measures of success and 
other criteria of evaluation (“norms”)? Whose 
facts and whose concerns should they 
represent? Ultimately, there is no single right 
way to decide such questions. Yet at some 
point argumentation has to end and practical 
action has to begin. Boundary judgments 
define the boundaries of argumentation in two 
interdependent ways: First, they delimit the 
reference system that is considered relevant, 
that is, the context that matters when it comes 
to assessing the merits and defects of a claim. 
In other words, they define what counts as 
relevant knowledge and whose concerns are to 
be considered as part of the problem. 
Likewise, since both knowledge and concerns 
always represent somebody’s facts and values, 
boundary judgments also define the group of 
people who are (or should be) involved in a 
project or who, if not involved, are (should be) 
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considered legitimate stakeholders. For 
instance, what are the concerns that should 
make up our notion of “improvement” for 
redesigning and developing an existing IS, 
whose concerns are they? Those parties whose 
concerns define our standards of improvement 
belong to the reference system in question. 
Boundary judgments thus define what 
knowledge is relevant and what concerns 
matter.  
Second, it follows that the boundary 
judgments in question also define the range of 
valid application of the arguments they 
underpin. In the example, this would be the 
precise context of implementation and use for 
which the redesigned IS can claim to bring an 
improvement. However, intentions (validity 
claims) and actual achievements are not 
always the same. It is thus always meaningful 
and relevant to question the effective reference 
system for which a proposal is valid. Not only 
conscious decisions to treat some aspect of a 
problem situation as not belonging to the 
relevant context can and need to be interpreted 
in terms of boundary judgments; rather, any 
deficit of argumentation amounts to a 
boundary judgment. For even if we are 
perfectly willing to consider some aspect as 
part of the problem, but then for whatever 
reasons (e.g., lack of information, failures of 
communication, errors of analysis or 
argumentation) fail to consider it adequately, 
we have effectively excluded this aspect from 
our reference system. 
I use the term “boundary judgments” 
rather than “boundaries” to emphasize the 
judgmental nature of boundary issues, for they 
depend on assumptions of facts and values that 
can always be questioned – there are no 
objectively right or necessary ways to bound 
the relevant context. I will discuss the specific 
nature of the boundary issues in question in a 
moment; at this point it is sufficient to note 
that I am talking of multiple conceptual 
systems boundaries rather than of a single 
physical boundary. 
It is hardly exaggerated to say that 
everything that really matters in an ISD project 
– what kind of “information” and “knowledge” 
it is to provide for whom, in what context of 
application, for what purposes and with a view 
to what kind of improvement – is heavily 
dependent on boundary judgments. No effort 
to argue comprehensively, as meaningful as it 
may be, should make us forget that all 
argumentation, all practice of applied science 
and systems design, is selective in the sense of 
depending on boundary judgments. The basic 
implication is that we can never be sure of 
having considered all possibly relevant facts 
and normative considerations – one reason 
why warrant design is such a difficult 
undertaking. A second implication is that all 
our claims are bound to be “partial” in the 
sense of not doing equal justice to all concerns. 
Reflective professional practice must face 
these implications. No amount of science and 
expertise can circumvent the problem of 
boundary judgments.  
Critical Systems Heuristics. In my 
work on critical systems heuristics (CSH), or 
more accurately, critical heuristics of social 
systems design (see, e.g., Ulrich 1983, 1987a, 
1993, 1996, 2000a, 2002a, b, and c), I have 
sought to develop a discursive framework that 
does justice to the problem of boundary 
judgments and uses it as the starting point for a 
critical systems approach to applied science, 
systems design, and reflective practice in 
general. Such a framework needs to meet two 
basic requirements. First, it needs to clarify the 
theoretical basis of a critical approach by 
grounding it in semiotics, epistemology, and 
practical philosophy. To this end, CSH relies 
on ideas similar to the ones suggested in the 
present paper but elaborates the philosophical 
issues involved in much more detail, drawing 
particularly on the writings of Kant (1781), 
Peirce (1878), Popper (1959, 1963), Apel 
(1980, 1981), Habermas (1979, 1984), and 
Churchman (1971, 1979). Second, it needs to 
translate this philosophical grounding into a 
pragmatic (in the everyday sense of the term) 
framework for reflective discursive practice. 
CSH finds the key to this in a new, critical 
understanding of the systems idea and in a 
related attempt to secure a critical handling of 
boundary judgments. The crucial idea consists 
in a systematic process of boundary critique; I 
will therefore begin my introduction to critical 
heuristics with this idea. 
Systematic boundary critique. 
Boundary critique is the methodological core 
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concept of critical systems heuristics. 
Increasingly, it is also recognized as a central 
concept of critical systems thinking and of 
critical professional practice in general. 
Boundary critique is a discursive process of 
surfacing boundary judgments, unfolding their 
implications, and examining the ways they 
condition validity claims. This is what I call 
boundary critique. 
Let us be sure, then, that we understand 
the fundamental nature and role of boundary 
judgments. The first thing to understand is why 
they are so fundamental. As my introductory 
explanation should have made clear, from a 
critical point of view the question is not 
whether we rely on boundary judgments but 
only how we handle them. Conventional 
systems thinking may be understood as an 
effort to expand our reference systems so that 
ideally we might claim that we consider “the 
whole relevant system” (Churchman 1971, p. 
8). Unfortunately, this sort of 
comprehensiveness is a claim reserved to 
heroes and gods. From a critical point of view, 
systems thinking cannot alter the fact that all 
our claims remain selective in the double sense 
explained above, of being selective with 
respect to relevant facts and norms and partial 
in the sense of benefiting some parties more 
than others. Boundary critique aims at 
disclosing this inevitable selectivity and 
partiality.  
How boundary judgments work. The 
second essential point we need to understand is 
how boundary judgments work. How exactly 
do they condition our reference system and the 
claims that may depend on it? CSH explains 
this by means of the eternal triangle of 
reference system, facts, and values: Whenever 
we propose a problem definition or solution, 
we cannot help but assert the relevance of 
some facts and norms as distinguished from 
others. Which facts and norms we should 
consider depends on how we bound the 
reference system, and vice-versa; as soon as 
we modify our boundary judgments, relevant 




Figure 4: The “eternal triangle” of boundary judgments, observations, and evaluations 
(Source: Ulrich 2000a, p. 252) 
 
Thinking through the triangle means to 
consider each of its corners in the light of the 
other two. For example, what new facts 
become relevant if we expand the boundaries 
of the reference system or modify our value 
judgments? How do our valuations look if we 
consider new facts that refer to a modified 
reference system? In what way may our 
reference system fail to do justice to the 
perspective of different stakeholder groups? 
Any claim that does not reflect on this 
“triangle” of boundary judgments, judgments 
of facts, and value judgments, risks claiming 
too much, by not disclosing its built-in 
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selectivity. In this way boundary judgments 
strongly influence the way we “see” a 
situation. It is thus never a bad idea to make it 
clear to ourselves and to others what these 
judgments are and how different the situation 
might look if we were to change them. I see 
much potential here for employing the systems 
idea in more self-critical ways than is 
common; in ways that truly promote self-
reflection, learning, openness, and tolerance 
toward others. Mutual understanding need not 
always mean consensus; we can learn to 
understand our differences rationally, by 
appreciating one another’s different reference 
systems and granting to each other that there is 
no single right set of boundary assumptions. 
This, it seems to me, is a definitive gain in 
communicative rationality, even where 
consensus is not available or does not live up 
to ideal conditions of rationality.  
Boundary categories. The next point 
the reader will want to understand is how we 
can identify boundary assumptions 
systematically. What types or categories of 
boundary issues are there, how do the 
boundary judgments in question look like? 
CSH offers a framework of twelve basic 
boundary categories (Figure 5). Each category 
stands for a type of boundary issue that 
unavoidably comes up in all systems design 
and practice. What matters is not so much the 
specific terms I propose for the categories but 
rather their intent, that is, the specific 
boundary issues they address. There are four 
groups of boundary issues. They refer to a 
claim’s sources of motivation and 
purposefulness; of power and control; of 
knowledge and expertise; and of legitimation 
and normative acceptability. The first category 
of each group refers to a key group of actors 
concerned; the second to related core concerns; 
and the third to crucial difficulties raised by 
the two previous issues. 
 
Figure 5: Boundary categories of critical systems heuristics 
(Source: W. Ulrich, 1983, p. 258; 1996, p. 43; and 2000a, p. 256) 
 
In any concrete situation, assumptions 
concerning these twelve boundary issues make 
up the reference system we use for defining 
“the problem” or assessing the merits and 
deficiencies of any proposals for 
“improvement” (e.g., a solution proposal, 
design, evaluation, recommendation, decision, 
and so on). Since a claim’s underpinning 
reference system is so fundamental to 
understanding its meaning and validity, we can 
use the twelve boundary categories as guides 
for reflecting about many issues that pose 
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themselves in ISD projects. We may use them 
for a general assessment of a design or project 
as a whole, for instance when we face 
conflicting expectations and concerns of the 
different parties involved or affected. We may 
equally use them as guides in dealing with 
particular questions that come up in a project, 
or we can use them to surface such questions 
in the first place. In all these applications, we 
will want to examine boundary assumptions in 
the light of those steps of the philosophical 
staircase that appear particularly relevant for 
clarifying the claims involved. Obviously, 
before we can do so we need to familiarize 
ourselves with the intent of the boundary 
categories and learn to use them for 
formulating relevant questions – the next step. 
Boundary questions. The boundary 
categories can be translated into a checklist of 
critical boundary questions (Ulrich 1987a, 
1993, 1996, 2000). I have formulated these so 
that they should make clear the intent of each 
boundary category; the second part of each 
question (beginning with “That is, …”) gives a 
definition of that category. For each boundary 
category there are two questions, one 
formulated in the “is” mode (what is actually 
the case?), the other in the “ought” mode (what 
should ideally be the case?). Only by opposing 
“is” and “ought” answers can we fully 
appreciate the selectivity of the boundary 
judgments concerned; differences between “is” 
and “ought” answers (which are frequent) 
point to unresolved boundary issues (Table 4). 
I suggest we use boundary questions for three 
critical purposes: 
• First, to identify and unfold systematically 
the boundary issues raised by a claim – 
What boundary judgments are actually 
underpinning the claim (“is” 
assumptions), as distinguished from those 
I or we (those involved) would like to rely 
on (“ought” assumptions)? What is their 
empirical and normative selectivity, whose 
concerns do they reflect?  
• Second, to address concerns other than 
those privileged by the present situation – 
What are the boundary judgments in terms 
of which we can understand the concerns 
of different groups of stakeholders? What 
options are there for adapting the assumed 
reference systems so as to accommodate 
these concerns? How different would the 
claim in question then look? 
• Third, to identify and challenge in a 
compelling way any claims to knowledge 
and rationality that do not declare their 
underpinning boundary judgments – What 
boundary judgments does this claim take 
for granted? Whose concerns do these 
boundary judgments treat as irrelevant or 
marginal, and what does that tell us about 
the selectivity of the claims linked to 
them? 
Emancipatory boundary critique. 
The last-mentioned guideline leads to an 
emancipatory employment of boundary 
critique. Lest boundary critique depend 
entirely on the goodwill of those involved, 
anyone who has understood the basic idea can 
also use boundary critique against parties who 
are not willing to handle their boundary 
judgments so self-critically. This is an 
important application of boundary critique; it 
means that unlike Habermas’ ideal model of 
discourse, CSH does not depend on the 
anticipation of an ideal speech situation in 
which influence, power and skills are 
distributed symmetrically and all participants 
are willing to rely on no force but that of the 
stronger argument. Boundary critique puts 
people whose concerns have been ignored or 
marginalized in a situation in which they can 
translate their concerns into cogent critical 
argumentation. They can now make it apparent 
to everyone (also publicly) how the arguments 
of those in control of the situation depend on 
boundary judgments that have not been 
declared. By advancing alternative boundary 
judgments that may be overtly subjective, they 
can demonstrate that there are options, and in 
this way can also make apparent the intrinsic 
selectivity and partiality of the claims they 
contest. Since boundary judgments cannot be 
justified by reference to an advantage of 
theoretical expertise and knowledge, anyone 
can use them for critical purposes without 
running the risk of being convicted of 
insufficient expertise or competence. In this 
way, emancipatory boundary critique can help 
create a new symmetry of critical competence 
under everyday conditions of asymmetric 
influence and incomplete rationality.  
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Table 4: Boundary questions of critical systems heuristics 
(Source: W. Ulrich, 1987, p. 279; 1996, pp. 24-31; and 2000a, p. 258) 
Sources of Motivation 
(1) Who is (ought to be) the client? That is, whose interests are (should be) served? 
(2) What is (ought to be) the purpose? That is, what are (should be) the consequences? 
(3) What is (ought to be) the measure of improvement? That is, how can (should) we 
determine whether and in what way the consequences, taken together, constitute an 
improvement? 
Sources of Power 
(4) Who is (ought to be) the decision maker? That is, who is (should be) in a position to change 
the measure of improvement? 
(5) What resources are (ought to be) controlled by the decision maker? That is, what conditions 
of success can (should) those involved control? 
(6) What conditions are (ought to be) part of the environment? That is, what conditions does 
(should) the decision maker not control (e.g., from the viewpoint of those not involved)? 
Sources of Knowledge 
(7) Who is (ought to be) involved as a professional? That is, who is (should be) involved as an 
expert, e.g., as a system designer, researcher, or consultant? 
(8) What expertise is (ought to be) consulted? That is, what counts (should count) as relevant 
knowledge? 
(9) What or who is (ought to be) assumed to be the guarantor? That is, what is (should) be 
considered a source of guarantee (e.g., consensus among experts, stakeholder involvement, 
support of decision-makers, etc.)? 
Sources of Legitimation 
(10) Who is (ought to be) witness to the interests of those affected but not involved? That is, who 
is (should be) treated as legitimate stakeholder, and who argues (should argue) the case of 
those stakeholders who cannot speak for themselves, including the handicapped, the 
unborn, and non-human nature? 
(11) What secures (ought to secure) the emancipation of those affected from the premises and 
promises of those involved? That is, where does (should) legitimacy lie?  
(12)  What world view is (ought to be) determining? That is, what different visions of 
improvement are (should be) considered and somehow reconciled? 
 
In addition to creating better 
argumentative chances for those who are 
willing to submit their claims to argumentation 
(as against those who are not so willing), 
emancipatory boundary critique also allows 
discourse participants to analyze their 
differences in terms of divergent reference 
systems rather than accusing one another of 
lacking rationality or of getting their facts or 
values wrong. In this way, people can at least 
agree about why they disagree, and can so 
better appreciate the different rationalities of 
those with whom they are at cross-purposes 
(sic – boundary category #2). I cannot explain 
this emancipatory side of critical systems 
heuristics in any more detail here but invite the 
reader to consult some of the original sources 
(Ulrich, 1983, entire Ch. 5; 1987, p. 281f; 
1993, pp. 599-605; 2000a, pp. 257-260). 
Contrasting two types of reference 
systems. CSH distinguishes between two basic 
reference systems that can help us grasp the 
intrinsic selectivity of a system design. The 
first is the one that actually informs the design 
effort of those involved; it represents their 
primary system of concern and hence, their 
basic context of justification. The second is a 
larger context that includes all the effects that a 
claim may possibly impose on third parties, 
including those stakeholders whose concerns 
may not be represented by the primary system 
of concern. CSH conceives of this larger 
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context as a claim’s context of application. In 
order to fully appreciate the selectivity of a 
design, we should try to understand both 
reference systems. For critical purposes, it is a 
good idea to maintain a critical tension 
between them: each can help us to see the 
other in a critical light. Both the primary 
system of concern and the context of 
application can of course be unfolded 
systematically by means of the boundary 
categories and questions.  
Critically systemic discourse. I call 
the suggested discursive framework critically 
systemic discourse, for it marries the ideas of 
critical systems thinking and discourse in a 
mutually supportive manner:  
On the one hand, systemic boundary 
critique renders critical discourse cogent 
without requiring ideal conditions of 
complete rationality. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the only model of 
discourse today that achieves this. It 
allows discursive examination of validity 
claims without depending for its 
rationality on ideally rational consensus, 
that is, on a condition that in practice is 
illusory. Critically systemic discourse 
does not sacrifice rational discursive 
practice to such a theoretical concept of 
rational discourse. It renounces a one-
sided focus on consensus as a source of 
reasonable practice in favor of a sustained 
effort to deal critically with the fact that 
under everyday conditions we can hardly 
ever assume conditions of complete 
rationality. The point of rational discourse 
is then to deal critically with conditions of 
incomplete rationality and thus to create 
more practical rationality, rather than 
presupposing it. This kind of discourse is 
about being (self-) critical rather than 
being right. This is the “critical turn” of 
rationality that I advocate. Boundary 
discourse is my proposal for practicing the 
critical turn. Insofar as it creates improved 
symmetry of critical competence, it 
pragmatizes the ideal speech situation in a 
critically tenable way.  
On the other hand, boundary discourse 
also operationalizes the basic idea of 
critical systems thinking, of using systems 
thinking in the service of reflective 
practice. Note that the systems idea is 
similarly ideal in its quest for 
comprehensiveness in looking at a 
problem as is the idea of achieving 
complete justification of claims by means 
of discourse. Boundary critique thus not 
only improves chances for cogent 
argumentation – at least for critical 
purposes – under everyday conditions of 
imperfect rationality, it is also the only 
way systems thinking can be critically 
tenable.  
In view of this double capacity of 
making critical discourse practicable and 
systems thinking critically tenable, I suggest 
that boundary critique is a methodological 
core idea for any discursive approach to 
reflective practice. Thus far, systems designers 
were facing an impossible choice between a 
discursive framework such as the one of 
Habermas, which is critically tenable but not 
practicable, or a more conventional 
monological framework as represented by 
prevailing notions of applied science and 
expertise (including systems science and 
systems methodologies), which are practicable 
but not critically tenable – and for this reason 
also fail to promote reflective practice. 
Critically systemic discourse offers a way out 
of this dilemma; its concept of rational 
discourse is both critically tenable and 
practicable. It stands for a conception of 
systems thinking and systems design that is 
fundamentally discursive and thus offers a 
radical alternative to the prevailing 
understanding of critical systems thinking in 
terms of informed methodology choice, an 
approach that I have elsewhere examined in 
detail and found methodologically incapable of 
supporting reflective practice (see Ulrich 
2000b and 2002c; shorter in 2001, p.19f).  
• 
• 
As a final comment, it is only natural 
that new ideas of the kind I have presented 
appear somewhat abstract and theoretical as 
long as they are not yet familiar. I can assure 
the reader, however, that boundary critique is 
anything but an abstract theoretical idea. 
Boundary judgments are not an exotic 
invention of mine; rather, they are omnipresent 
out there in the world of social practice. Once 
you have understood the concept, you will see 
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boundary judgments at work in your 
professional life every day and you will hear 
them playing their part in discussions 
everywhere, whether in the media or on the 
bus. People use them all the time without 
being aware of them and of how they condition 
what they say. A discursive framework such as 
critically systemic discourse is required to 
change the situation and to render the concept 
useful for reflective practice.  
8 APPLICATION 
Some recommendations. Returning at 
the end of this paper to the field of ISD, I 
would like to summarize the key ideas outlined 
in the paper in the form of three basic 
recommendation or guidelines for ISD 
professionals who wish to become more 
reflective practitioners:  
1. Conceive of reflective practice in terms of 
the philosophical staircase for ISD, that 
is, examine the validity claims 
underpinning any specific design or use of 
an IS by climbing the staircase step for 
step and reflecting on the questions each 
step may raise. 
2. Familiarize yourself with the idea of 
systematic boundary critique as it has 
been conceptualized and pragmatized in 
critical systems heuristics. 
3. Engage in critically systemic discourse 
with both colleagues involved in and 
stakeholders concerned by an ISD project 
on which you work, and start applying the 
idea of discursive boundary critique – of 
boundary discourse – to all or selected 
steps of the staircase. 
For some further guidelines and an 
example of their application, although not to 
an ISD problem, see Ulrich (2000a, pp. 260-
264). Some more detailed case studies from 
various fields of application can be found in 
Ulrich (1981; 1983, chapters 7 and 8); Flood & 
Jackson (1991); Topp (1995); Midgley et al. 
(1998); and Carr and Levidow (2000). Finally, 
some recent attempts at applying the idea of 
boundary critique to ISD can be found in two 
papers and a forthcoming dissertation by 
Cordoba and collaborators (Cordoba 2002, 
Cordoba et al. 2000a, b)3. To conclude the 
present paper, I would like to give a short 
account of Cordoba’s approach; I will then 
modify it slightly so that it can help the reader 
to concretize the three recommendations just 
given and to put them into practice.  
A practical application. Cordoba starts 
from the observation that much of present-day 
IS planning is based on an instrumental and 
strategic kind of rationality – in his words, 
“technological and business driven” and 
focusing on increasing “maximum turnover of 
investments made” or providing “competitive 
advantage.” His concern is that this sort of 
approach is particularly inadequate for 
developing countries, where IT and IS are 
considered as vital tools for “catching up” with 
other countries; being part of the global 
Information Society is seen as a fast track 
towards improvements in education, 
employment, social conditions of life, and 
democracy. However, practice does not always 
live up to these expectations. Cordoba refers to 
recent efforts in Columbia (a country whose 
citizen he is and with which he is therefore 
familiar) to establish a national plan for the use 
of IT and IS with a view to improving access 
to information and communication services for 
large parts of the population. He observes that 
two years after the plan was established, it has 
not been fully implemented and has achieved 
little progress in making information services 
more accessible to people. For instance, “vast 
rural areas still remain isolated from the rest of 
the country. Internet connections will only 
increase from 500.000 now to 1.2 millions in 
2002. Plans to massively use IS in education 
[by providing schools with Internet access] 
                                                 
3  I have some reservations about the account of 
my understanding of boundary critique in Cordoba 
et al. (2000b). This account, though partly correct, 
follows a number of previous misrepresentations of 
my work by one of Cordoba’s co-authors (e.g. 
Midgley et al. 1998); for this reason I prefer to refer 
the reader to Cordoba et al. (2000a), as this papers 
offers a shorter but more adequate account of my 
ideas. For authentic recent introductions, see Ulrich 
(1996, 2000a, 2001, 2002a, b, c). 
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find resistance among teachers and educational 
institutions.” (Cordoba et al., 2000a, p. 4).  
The story certainly looks familiar to 
anyone who has ever participated in projects 
directed at improving particular social 
conditions and has observed how issues of 
social systems design are treated as mere 
issues of “tool design” (Ulrich 1981, p. 36, and 
1983, p. 329): the myth that “better technology 
can help solve practical problems” is 
apparently immune against all practical failure 
(Lyytinen and Robey 1999). With this concern 
in mind, Cordoba turned to the idea of 
boundary critique as the core concept of his 
approach to IS planning in Columbia. He 
reports on an ISD project aimed at supporting 
teaching and research at Javeriana University 
in Bogotá in which he was involved. To help 
define IT/IS requirements in a way that should 
respond to the needs of staff and students, he 
designed the methodology summarized in 
Figure 6. My subsequent account follows 







Concerns, values and assumptions of
ideas, plans and initiatives to improve way of life
Boundaries
Concerns
Action plans (including ICTP)
 
Figure 6: A discursive framework for boundary critique as used in Columbia 
by Cordoba et al. (2000a, b) 
 
The methodology consisted of two 
stages of discourse. First, a stage of 
distinction was used to identify the different 
concerns of people as they voiced them. 
Second, a stage of improvement was used in 
which specific improvements were 
presented to the participants to see whether 
some of them captured their concerns and 
could be transformed into concrete action 
with or without IS. The conceptual link 
between the two stages consisted in 
boundary critique. The idea was to make 
sure no issues, people, or activities were 
excluded or marginalized in the process. 
This was achieved by applying the 
boundary questions of critical systems 
heuristics to both the concerns identified and to 
the proposals for improvement. Questions such as 
“who else should be included” or “what else 
should be included,” specified for particular 
boundary categories, were driving the process of 
debate with the participants. Posing the questions 
in the “ought” as opposed to the “is” mode 
allowed participants to reflect on other aspects 
that should be addressed, beyond their original 
concerns. Facilitators also encouraged 
participants to reflect on the relevant sources of 
knowledge that should be used in the process, 
including new participants and new 
methodologies. In order to keep the process of 
pushing out the boundaries manageable, some 
practical limits were predefined in terms of 
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feasible actions within the University, 
financial constraints, and others. These 
imposed boundaries were, however, 
acknowledged and thus considered more 
consciously than they might have been 
without the process of boundary critique. I 
should mention here that my own 
understanding of boundary critique, 
including ecological and ethical boundary 
critique, does not imply that the process is 
always oriented to pushing out system 
boundaries; when it comes to critical 
systems thinking, bigger is not 
automatically better (see Ulrich 1993, p. 
583-585; 1996, pp. 36f; 2001, p. 23). 
In Cordoba’s evaluation of the 
experience,  
“The approach allowed the emergence 
of issues not addressed by traditional 
methodologies of IS planning. 
Particularly it helped to identify the 
assumptions that people have regarding 
the purpose and usefulness of IS. It also 
helped to identify the concerns of those 
who are in charge. … Asking about 
concerns seems to be a useful element 
to facilitate inclusion of people and 
issues into actions. … In this way IS 
planning can become a continuous 
dialogue in the creation of knowledge 
and meaning.” (Cordoba et al., 2000a, 
p. 7) 
An improved three-stage model 
for critically systemic discourse. In my 
own evaluation, the reported application of 
boundary critique seems to come close in 
many respects to what I intend by critically 
systemic discourse, except that in this case 
the issue of uncovering the validity claims 
involved does not appear to have been a 
major concern, as of course the process was 
not informed by the philosophical staircase. 
In any case I would suggest modifying the 
process slightly, so as to give a systematic 
place to the idea of a discursive examination 
of validity claims, particularly as implied by 
mutual understanding on improvement. In 
what way are the claims to improvement 
selective? Following the logic of the 
staircase, claims to improvement might be 
systematically analyzed in terms of 
underpinning assumptions regarding 
“information,” “knowledge,” and “rationality”: 
1. What counts as adequate information and to 
whom is it to be provided by the information 
system in question? (Semiotic clarification & 
critique, steps 1 - 3 of the staircase)  
2. How is the IS embedded in a larger context 
that makes sure users and other actors will be 
in a situation to base their actions on valid 
knowledge? (Epistemological validation & 
critique, steps 4-6)  
3. Wherein consists the rationality of the 
practice thus supported, that is, what 
concept(s) of rationality and what 
corresponding concepts of improvement does 
it assume and whose rationality does it stand 
for? (Practical-philosophical rationalization, 
steps 7-9) 
Systems designers and facilitators might 
formulate pertinent questions in the language 
previously used by the participants and ask them, 
as well as possibly third parties not previously 
involved, to comment on these questions before 
defining the basic assumptions on which the IS 
design is to be based. 
How should the additional scrutiny be 
located in the process? It could be understood as 
an implicit part of boundary critique, which 
means criticizing validity claims in both stages 
according to Figure 6, or it could be assigned to 
an additional third stage that logically would 
have to follow the second. I think the second 
solution is easier to put into practice, for the 
following reasons.  
It does not burden the first stage of 
identifying the concerns of stakeholders with 
the more difficult issue of examining validity 
claims; it thus offers more flexibility for 
adapting the important first stage to the needs 
and language of the participants.  
• 
• The entire process is meant to crystallize into 
some proposals for action – I will call them 
“conclusions” – with a view to achieving 
improvement. It makes sense to focus the 
scrutiny of validity claims on the notion of 
“improvement” that is to guide further action. 
(Note that the quest for improvement is a 
core concept that orients CSH’s 
categorization of boundary issues and thus its 
understanding of boundary critique; see, e.g., 
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Ulrich 1983, pp. 236-239, 294 and 
254f; 1996, pp. 7-10; and 2001, p. 8f).  
A separate third stage makes allowance 
for the possibility that in stage 2, no 
consensus on proposals for 
improvement is reached. The final 
stage can then help participants 
understand why this is so and 
 
appreciate the conflicting rationalities and 
claims involved. On this basis of mutual 
understanding of differences, a new respect 
and tolerance can grow that may be 
conducive to finding some common ground 
for action. 
• 
The resulting three-stage model of 
critically systemic discourse is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: A three-stage model of critically systemic discourse 
 
The description of the process of 
boundary discourse in terms of three stages (or 
two in the case of Cordoba’s report) should of 
course be read as indicating a logical rather 
than a temporal order. During the entire 
process, participants should be allowed to 
reconsider the concerns they voiced originally, 
as well as the improvements they recognized 
as appropriate or refuted, particularly when it 
comes to unfolding the selectivity of implied 
validity claims. In the light of issues related to 
validity claims, it may well be that previously 
defined concerns and conclusions regarding 
“improvement” need to be reconsidered. The 
figure makes the iterative nature of the process 
obvious. 
As a final note concerning the 
implementation of critically systemic 
discourse, I would not exclude that it can also 
be usefully supported by appropriate software, 
and in this way could become an integral part 
of an interactive IS design. In this respect, I 
would like to refer the reader to Ivanov’s 
pertinent, though rather preliminary, 
reflections on the design of computer 
supported learning through what he calls 
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“hypersystems,” an interactive software 
application (possibly in the form of 
groupware) that would elicit and help to record 
an argumentative process structured along 
basic categories such as CSH’s boundary 
categories (Forsgren and Ivanov 1990; Ivanov 
1992 and 1993). 
Conclusion. With this three-stage 
model, we have concluded the outline of a 
discursive approach to reflective practice in 
ISD that incorporates the critical turn. The 
approach has thus three main elements: 
1. The philosophical staircase of ISD – a 
guide to identifying, and reflecting upon, 
the validity claims raised by a concrete 
ISD project (or by any specific aspect of 
its design). 
2. Critically systemic discourse – a 
discursive framework for examining 
validity claims that operationalizes the 
methodological core concept of systematic 
boundary critique. 
3. A three-stage model of critically systemic 
discourse – a practical way of applying 
boundary critique to the three issues of 
identifying the concerns of stakeholders; 
drawing conclusions concerning possible 
proposals for “improvement”; and 
examining the validity claims embodied in 
such proposals in terms of their empirical 
and normative selectivity. 
I wish you good reflective practice. 
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